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direct service in any manner it deems constitutional when other
methods of service fail.39 This section, together with the long-arm
jurisdiction and methods of service provided by CPLR 302 and 313,
seems to ensure that a plaintiff will almost always have a means
available to obtain jurisdiction over an absent defendant. As a result, the toll provided by CPLR 207 will rarely be utilized, since
jurisdiction usually will be obtainable by some statutory means
other than personal delivery within the state. In addition, while
Yarusso does not conclusively resolve the Goodemote-Sadek controversy, it does increase the likelihood that courts will follow the
Sadek position. A practitioner defending an action involving the
Goodemote-Sadek situation therefore should plead lack of jurisdiction or risk losing his client's statute of limitations defense.
ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE OF
COURT

CPLR 302: Application of the transactingbusiness predicate to
acquire in personam jurisdictionover nonresident individuals.
The demise of the territoriality concept of jurisdiction" and the
emergence of a "minimum contacts" approach" to the exercise of
CPLR 308(5).
The Supreme Court, in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), indicated that the
validity of an "in personam" judgment against a nonresident is dependent upon the defendant's presence in the forum state. This notion of territoriality developed into a rigid rule,
severely circumscribing the power of state courts over nonresident defendants. As the nation's
transportation and communication facilities increased in sophistication, however, this inflexible concept proved to be inadequate. Consequently, the territoriality theory ultimately
waned. See note 41 infra.
1 Before the "minimum contacts" approach was adopted, courts began developing
methods to circumvent the rigid territoriality concept. To deal with the problems presented
by Pennoyer's narrow view of state power, the fictions of "implied consent" and "presence"
were used to obtain jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries. See CPLR 302, commentary at 60-61
(McKinney 1972); 1 WK&M T 302.02. Thereafter, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Supreme Court departed from Pennoyer and reasoned that an
individual granted the privilege of conducting activities within a state is charged with assuming certain obligations with respect to that state. Thus, should a suit arise out of that individual's activity within the forum state, it is not unjust to require him to defend the action in
that forum. Id. at 320. The International Shoe Court went on to promulgate guidelines for
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents: "[I]n order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he [must]
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'." Id. at 316 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
In two major cases that followed the International Shoe decision, the Supreme Court
seemed to emphasize the qualitative aspect of a defendant's contact with the forum state. In
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), a single contact was considered to
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jurisdiction over nonresident defendants provided the impetus for
the enactment of CPLR 302.42 Among the various acts which may
serve as predicates for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
nondomiciliary under 302 is the transaction of any business within
the state."3 The absence of a precise legislative definition of
"transacts any business," however, coupled with the elusiveness of
the minimum contacts notion, has made it necessary for the courts
to determine the scope of CPLR 302(a)(1) on a case-by-case basis.
Recently, in George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz," the Court of Appeals further clarified its construction of CPLR 302(a) (1), upholding
the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident whose sole contact
with New York was a 1-day visit during which he made an agreement with a New York corporation for work to be performed outside
the state."
Defendant Arnold Schwartz, a Massachusetts resident, responded to an advertisement placed in the Boston Globe by George
Reiner and Company, a New York corporation. Subsequently, at the
latter's request and expense, Schwartz visited Reiner's corporate
offices in Albany and was interviewed by its president. During the
be a sufficient predicate for the assertion of jurisdiction by a California court over a nonresident insurance company. In the course of its opinion, the Court expressed special concern
for a state's legitimate interest in protecting its citizens from out-of-state insurers who are
hesitant to make good on claims. Subsequently, in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958),
the Supreme Court tempered the holdings of InternationalShoe and McGee by concluding
that
it is a mistake to assume that this trend [away from the concept of territoriality]
heralds the eventual demise of all [jurisdictional] restrictions ....

However

minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be
called upon to do so unless he has had the [requisite] 'minimal contacts' with that
State ....
Id. at 251.
11CPLR 302 was enacted by the legislature in 1962. Ch. 308, § 302, [1962] N.Y. Laws
615 (McKinney). It is a "single act" statute, requiring only one act or occasional acts for the
assertion of jurisdiction, see CPLR 302, qommentary at 62 (McKinney 1972), provided that
the cause of action arises out of defendant's New York activity. In this respect, CPLR 302 is
narrower in scope than CPLR 301, as the latter provision permits any cause of action to be
maintained once the defendant is shown to be "doing business" in New York. See 1 WK&M
301.17, 302.05.
11CPLR 302 provides in part:
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. As to a cause of action arising from
any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or
through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state ....
" 41 N.Y.2d 648, 363 N.E.2d 551, 394 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1977), aff'g 49 App. Div. 2d 58, 371
N.Y.S.2d 177 (3d Dep't 1975).
"5 41 N.Y.2d at 654, 363 N.E.2d at 555, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
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interview, an employment agreement was made which established
defendant as an out-of-state salesman for the corporation. More
than 4 years later, Reiner instituted an action against defendant,
alleging violations of the terms of the employment relationship."
Defendant, claiming lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, moved to dismiss the action. 7 Upholding defendant's contention that personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) was lacking,
the Supreme Court, Albany County, granted the dismissal motion. 8
A divided appellate division reversed and reinstated the complaint. 9
The Court of Appeals held that jurisdiction may properly be
asserted over Schwartz." In resolving the question whether defendant had transacted business in New York, Judge Cooke, writing for
a unanimous Court, undertook a brief review of decisions construing
CPLR 302(a)(1).5' Distilling these prior opinions, Judge Cooke
found that a nonresident's activities should be viewed collectively
rather than individually in determining whether an assertion of jurisdiction is warranted.12 The Schwartz Court was quick to emphasize, however, that a single act might be a sufficient predicate for
obtaining jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant." Applying

" Plaintiff, alleging that Schwartz "knowingly, willfully and fraudulently violated the
terms of the contract," sought recovery of an amount alleged to represent the retained excess
of drawings over commissions. Id. at 649, 363 N.E.2d at 552, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
47 Id.

IId.
50
SI

49 App. Div. 2d at 60, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 179.
41 N.Y.2d at 653, 363 N.E.2d at 554, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
Id. at 651-53, 363 N.E.2d at 553-54, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 846-47.

Id. at 653-54, 363 N.E.2d at 555, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 848. Judge Cooke pointed to the
Court's earlier decision in Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15
N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965), as illustrating
that a nonresident's cumulative conduct may sustain an assertion of jurisdiction. The New
York activities which the Longines Court found decisive were preliminary contract negotiations by high level personnel for two months, the execution of a supplementary contract, the
shipment of two machines, and the presence of two engineers to supervise installation and
testing of the machines. 15 N.Y.2d at 457, 209 N.E.2d at 75-76, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
1 41 N.Y.2d at 651, 363 N.E.2d at 553, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 846. The Court of Appeals and
several noted commentators previously have suggested that CPLR 302 jurisdiction may be
premised upon a single act. See Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 16,
256 N.E.2d 506, 507-08, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337, 339 (1970); CPLR 302, commentary at 62 (McKinney 1972); 1 WK&M 302.07; note 42 supra.
In both Hi Fashion Wigs, Inc. v. Peter Hammond Advertising, Inc., 32 N.Y.2d 583, 300
N.E.2d 421, 347 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1973), and Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d
13, 256 N.E.2d 506, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1970), jurisdiction seems to have been predicated upon
one act. Franklyn involved a California resident who had participated in a New York auction
by telephone. In sustaining an exercise of jurisdiction based upon this incident, the Court of
Appeals found a sufficiently "purposeful transaction to confer jurisdiction in New York." 26
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these principles to the facts in Schwartz, Judge Cooke ruled that
defendant's purposeful entry into New York, his interview, and
entrance into an agreement which established a continuing relationship with his New York employer, coupled with the fact that the
claim arose from those transactions, created "the 'clearest sort of
case' in which our courts would have 302 jurisdiction."5 4 Moreover,
the Court of Appeals observed, this exercise of jurisdiction is well
within constitutional bounds since "defendant has purposefully
availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in our jurisdiction, thus invoking the benefits and protection of our laws." 55
Acknowledging that a jurisdictionally borderline situation might
have been presented if defendant had entered the state solely for the
formal execution of a contract," the Court concluded that "we have
before us . . . a day [in New York] which included . . .the purposeful creation of a continuing relationship with a New York corporation.""
The exercise of in personam jurisdiction over Schwartz appears
N.Y.2d at 17, 256 N.E.2d at 508, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 340. The HiFashionWigs Court determined
that a third-party defendant who had journeyed to New York for the purpose of delivering
his guarantee on a contract was subject to CPLR 302 jurisdiction. Chief Judge Fuld reasoned
that the contract of guarantee had been made in New York but went on to observe that even
if this were not the case, New York nonetheless would exercise jurisdiction. 32 N.Y.2d at 587,
300 N.E.2d at 423, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
- 41 N.Y.2d at 653, 363 N.E.2d at 554, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 847 (quoting Hi Fashion Wigs,
Inc. v. Peter Hammond Advertising, Inc., 32 N.Y.2d 583, 586, 300 N.E.2d 421, 422, 347
N.Y.S.2d 47, 49 (1973)).
15 41 N.Y.2d at 653, 363 N.E.2d at 554, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 847 (citing Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
"' Mere execution of a contract in New York, in itself, might not give a New York court
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See CPLR 302, commentary at 78 (McKinney
1972). Since other recognizable contacts usually accompany a contract execution, however,
this event frequently will give rise to New York jurisdiction. See id. at 78-79. See generally 1
WK&M $ 302.09.
1,41 N.Y.2d at 653, 363 N.E.2d at 554, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 848. Defendant Schwartz urged
that McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 377, 229 N.E.2d 604, 283 N.Y.S.2d
34 (1967), dictated a finding that CPLR 302 jurisdiction could not be asserted over him. 41
N.Y.2d at 653-54, 363 N.E.2d at 555, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 848. In McKee, defendant, an Illinois
corporation, sent a representative into New York to help resolve a dispute between a distributor of its equipment and various consulting engineers in a school project. Relying on Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), the McKee Court held this contact to be "infinitesimal"
rather than "minimal" and refused to assert jurisdiction. 20 N.Y.2d at 382, 229 N.E.2d at
607, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
The Schwartz Court distinguished McKee, noting that defendant Schwartz had entered
into "purposeful activity in New York directed toward and resulting in the establishment of
a contractual relationship. . . " 41 N.Y.2d at 654, 363 N.E.2d at 555, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
The situation in McKee was viewed as merely a casual attempt by the defendant to smooth
out difficulties between its distributor and his customers. Id.
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constitutionally permissible." Defendant voluntarily entered the
state expecting to form a business relationship with a New York
corporation. In addition to being present in the state on the day of
his visit, defendant negotiated and entered into an agreement creating an on-going relationship with a New York resident." Thus, since
defendant did indeed avail himself "of the privilege of conducting
activities" in New York, his motion to dismiss on due process
grounds was properly denied."o More importantly, however,
Schwartz sheds additional light on the meaning of the "transacts
any business" clause. The Court indicated that it is the nature and
quality and not merely the quantity of a nonresident's contacts with
New York that are determinative." In evaluating these contacts, the
activities of the nonresident should be viewed comprehensively and
not as isolated incidents. Under these guidelines, the conclusion
that defendant Schwartz transacted business in the state appears
justifiable. The import of this holding seems clear: "[W]hen a
defendant physically enters New York on a commercial enterprise,
he will have a most difficult time persuading the court that he was
not at least transacting business.""2
ARTICLE

14 -

CONTRIBUTION

Third-partyplaintiff may not enforce judgment for contribution
until he has paid more than his Dole share to plaintiff.
Article 14 of the CPLR, codifying the Court of Appeals' landThe Supreme Court has indicated that a defendant's single contact is sufficient to
enable a state court to assert personal jurisdiction over him. See McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In McGee, the defendant insurance company mailed a reinsurance certificate to a California resident offering to insure the latter in accordance with the
terms of the expired agreement. The record showed this to be the only contact the defendant
company had with California; nonetheless, the Court concluded that due process requirements were met. 355 U.S. at 223. The New York activities of Schwartz, see text accompanying
note 46 supra, appear to be more extensive and pervasive than the contacts found acceptable
in McGee. In fact, Dean McLaughlin has stated that the exercise of jurisdiction in Schwartz
was within the limits of the due process clause. McLaughlin, Long-Arm Jurisdiction,
N.Y.L.J., June 10, 1977, at 2, col. 1.
" 41 N.Y.2d at 653-54, 363 N.E.2d at 554-55, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
" See note 58 supra.
81 Thus, in assessing the exercise of CPLR 302(a)(1) jurisdiction, the nature and quality
of each individual defendant's activities have to be examined to determine whether he indeed
was transacting business in New York. Certain factors are deemed important by courts
making such a determination: (1) who was present in the state, (2) was he a high level official
of the corporation, (3) what was he doing in New York, (4) were there contract negotiations
in the state, and if so, of what duration? See, e.g., Moser v. Boatman, 392 F. Supp. 270, 27273 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
6 McLaughlin, Long-Arm Jurisdiction,N.Y.L.J., June 10, 1977, at 1, col. 1.

